How Scottish & Newcastle Became the U.K.’s Largest Brewer:

A Case of Regulatory Capture? by Bower, Julie & Cox, Howard
Business History Review 86 (Spring 2012): 43–68. doi:10.1017/S0007680512000037
© 2012 The President and Fellows of Harvard College. ISSN 0007-6805; 2044-768X (Web). 
M
Julie Bower and Howard Cox
How Scottish & Newcastle 
Became the U.K.’s Largest Brewer: 
A Case of Regulatory Capture? 
Firms engage in a multitude of interactions with the external 
environment, most critically with government and its regula-
tory agencies. Despite an extensive literature on “regulatory 
capture,” little attention has been paid to the interactions be-
tween merging fi rms and competition authorities. Yet the pos-
sibility of capture exists where there is a recurring series of 
merger investigations of one fi rm by the same authority. This 
analysis of the impact of political infl uence on the merger his-
tory of the brewing fi rm Scottish & Newcastle extends into a 
discussion of regulatory capture in the oversight of British 
brewery mergers during the 1980s and 1990s. 
ergers, acquisitions, and hostile bids are a prominent feature of 
industrial and fi rm development, providing an important mech-
anism whereby weak management and faulty corporate strategies are 
exposed and eliminated. While merger activity can occur at any time, 
“merger waves” have been evident throughout history, surging most 
notably after World War II in the United Kingdom in 1953–54, 1959–
61, 1968, 1972, 1978–79, and 1984–87.1 There are several reasons for 
1 Julie Bower relied on data and information from several archives, offi cial Web sites and 
trade associations while completing her PhD thesis at the University of Warwick. All merger 
reports are accessible from the Web sites of the Competition Commission (www.competition-
commission.org.uk), the European Commission (http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/competition/index_
en.htm), and the Federal Trade Commission (www.ftc.gov/bc/index.shtml). Antitrust inves-
tigation reports on the U.K. brewing industry (1969 and 1989) are available in hard copy from 
Her Majesty’s Stationary Offi ce. Press releases relating to the 1989 antitrust investigation are 
available on request from the archive of the U.K. government’s Department for Business, In-
novation and Skills. Firms’ annual reports can be accessed from the archives of the London 
Business School and the University of Strathclyde (Matthew Brown and J. W. Cameron only). 
Data are also available on request from the British Beer and Pub Association (annual Statisti-
cal Handbook). Scottish & Newcastle plc kindly sent various items from its fi rm archive, in-
cluding copies of listing particulars for all the mergers referred to in this article, in addition 
to offer and defense documents. Julie Bower also relied on material written during her time 
as an investment analyst at various City of London investment banks from 1992 to 1999.
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the occurrence of mergers in waves: the availability of capital to fi nance 
mergers and acquisitions is likely to be cyclical; fi rms have a natural ten-
dency to copy competitors; and the political climate might favor larger 
fi rms that are either international in scope or are more diversifi ed.
In the British alcoholic beverages industry, four merger waves have 
been identifi ed and discussed in detail by Teresa da Silva Lopes.2 Terry 
R. Gourvish and Richard G. Wilson note the decisive period of change 
in British brewing brought about by merger activity from 1959 to 1961.3 
It was largely from this merger wave that what became known as the 
“Big Six” vertically integrated brewer-retailers emerged. Allied Brewer-
ies, the forerunner of the international spirits fi rm Allied Domecq, was 
formed in 1961 from the merger of three independent fi rms: Ind Coope 
of Burton-on-Trent, Tetley Walker of Leeds, and Ansells of Birmingham. 
Scottish & Newcastle emerged from the 1960 merger of two family busi-
nesses, Scottish Brewers Ltd. and the Newcastle Breweries Ltd.4 Bass 
Brewers emerged somewhat later, in 1967, through the merger of Bass, 
Mitchells and Butlers Ltd. and Charrington United Breweries.5 
While 1972 witnessed a change of ownership for two of the Big Six 
(Imperial Group, the parent of Imperial Tobacco, bought Courage, and 
hotel and property conglomerate Grand Metropolitan made a successful 
hostile bid for Watney Mann), the remainder of the 1970s was a relatively 
quiet period, when the fi rms engaged in similar small-scale diversifi ca-
tion strategies that encompassed food, spirits, and hotels and leisure 
acquisitions. However, the 1980s emerged as a particularly acquisitive 
period for the British alcoholic beverages industry, both domestically 
and internationally, and was notable for the rise in hostile bids. 
In an earlier analysis, Julie Bower showed that hostile bids (where 
the management of the target fi rm refuses to cooperate with the bidder 
fi rm) were more likely to be referred to the competition authorities than 
agreed bids (where the managements of the two fi rms agree on terms 
before the bid is made public).6 Further, in U.K. brewing industry bids 
2 Teresa da Silva Lopes, “Brands and the Evolution of Multinationals in Alcoholic Bever-
ages,” Business History 44 (July 2002): 1–30, ascribes “merger waves” in the alcoholic bev-
erages industry to a combination of several factors related to the evolution of the industry 
and also to the strategy of the fi rms.
3 Terry R. Gourvish and Richard G. Wilson, The British Brewing Industry 1830–1980 
(Cambridge, U.K., 1994), chart the development of the Big Six national brewer-retailers 
through a series of mergers of family-owned regional brewers.
4 Monopolies and Mergers Commission (hereafter, MMC), “Scottish & Newcastle Brewer-
ies plc and Matthew Brown plc: A Report on the Proposed Merger,” Cmnd [Command of Her 
Majesty] 9645 (1985): 15.
5 A chronology of the key mergers of the Big Six from 1960 is shown in MMC, “Bass plc, 
Carlsberg A/S and Carlsberg-Tetley plc: A Report on the Merger Situation,” Cm [Command 
of Her Majesty] 3662 (1997): 141.
6 Julie Bower, “Strategic Interactions with Competition Authorities in the U.K. Alcoholic 
Beverages Industry,” PhD thesis, University of Warwick, 2007.
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specifi cally, political infl uence increased the likelihood that a merger 
would be referred. Since referral itself often prompted fi rms to aban-
don proposed mergers for fear of becoming the subjects of lengthy and 
costly investigations, would-be acquirers had to adapt their merger strat-
egies accordingly. As a result, agreed bids became the norm, in some 
cases through merger alliances with competitors solely in order to gain 
regulatory clearance.7 
In this article, we describe the emergence of Scottish & Newcastle 
as the United Kingdom’s largest brewer through the landmark acquisi-
tion of Courage in 1995 that prompted the subsequent exit from the 
domestic scene of leading competitors Bass and Whitbread. From its 
heartland in Scotland and northeast England, Scottish & Newcastle em-
barked on an aggressive merger strategy to augment its corporate ob-
jective of creating national brands. In pursuing this objective, the fi rm 
played up the political connections of the company’s chief executive, 
Alick (later Sir Alick) Rankin, to full advantage while dealing with the 
U.K. merger regime. Without Rankin’s strategic foresight and the power-
ful political infl uence he wielded as a businessman and leading supporter 
of the Scottish Conservative Party, it is questionable whether Scottish & 
Newcastle would have been as successful in implementing its merger 
growth strategy. 
In this analysis of the successful prosecution of Scottish & Newcas-
tle’s corporate growth strategy, we focus on the role played by individ-
ual manager entrepreneurs in the conduct of mergers. We are guided 
by investigations of regulatory capture reported in the literature that 
reveal the degree to which individuals and politically infl uential organi-
zations have determined the structure and trajectory of the industry and 
its fi rms. We argue that conventional tools of economic analysis tend to 
abstract from the political and cultural forces that underpin the conduct 
of mergers. A detailed historical analysis is required to understand the 
factors that shaped the evolution of this major fi rm and its competitors.8 
Regulatory Capture and the Politics of the Public Interest
In the 1960s, the British brewing industry was transformed 
from a collection of family fi rms into the national amalgamation of 
7 Typifi ed by Diageo and Pernod Ricard’s joint bid for Seagram in 2001.
8 Most merger analysis has utilized the axioms of industrial economics. A recent review of 
competition policy in the U.K. brewing industry by Margaret M. Slade, “Competition Policy 
Towards Brewing: Rational Response to Market Power or Unwarranted Interference in Effi -
cient Markets?” in The Economics of Beer (Oxford, U.K., 2011) is a good example of this ap-
proach. The study fi nds that the remedies adopted by the Monopolies and Mergers Commis-
sion during the 1980s for the purpose of generating industry effi ciency and benefi ting 
consumers produced questionable results. While acknowledging the strong infl uence of po-
litical lobbying, the study, however, makes no comment on how it affected policy. 
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brewer-retailers that became known as the Big Six. The legislative 
changes of the Companies Acts of 1947 and 1948 that made this devel-
opment possible resulted in requirements for increased accounting dis-
closure and led to the emergence of a market for corporate control. 
Prior to this legislation, many fi rms owed their continued existence to 
what Steve Toms and Mike Wright describe as weak corporate gover-
nance whose ownership characteristics prevented shareholders from 
exerting infl uence by means of either voice or exit.9
Notwithstanding a more formal competition policy established by 
the Monopolies and Restrictive Practices Act of 1948, merger regula-
tion in postwar Britain operated within the framework of considerable 
business lobbying and political bipartisanship.10 The existence of the 
“public interest provision” in competition policy that endured until pas-
sage of the Enterprise Act of 2002 (which created the independent 
Competition Commission), gave the Monopolies and Mergers Commis-
sion (MMC) the opportunity to consider antitrust infringements and 
mergers, not only with respect to their likely impact on prices and con-
sumer choice, but also with reference to, for example, employment and 
support for regional businesses.11 The MMC operated de facto as a 
government-directed agent. The provisions of the Fair Trading Act of 
1973 allowed the secretary of state (for trade and industry) both to refer 
a merger to the MMC and to overrule its fi ndings. The Act gave legiti-
macy to business lobbying and special-interest pleading whose inten-
sity was nowhere more apparent than in the defenses mounted against 
hostile bids. 
In considering how individual management entrepreneurs might 
seek to infl uence the operation of competition policy, research in eco-
nomics on the phenomenon known as “regulatory capture” (which in 
broad terms describes how individual regulators cease to act indepen-
dently, as defi ned by their offi cial remit, and act in favor of the fi rms 
they are tasked with regulating) offers some relevant insights. Existing 
literature has tended to focus on the operations of utility companies, 
whose activities and performance carry signifi cant public good impli-
cations. The managers of utility fi rms meet regularly with their regula-
tory agency counterparts to discuss all aspects of their industry’s opera-
tions, including pricing strategies. These repeated interactions between 
regulators and fi rms create the pretext for capture. During periods of 
9 Steve Toms and Mike Wright, “Corporate Governance, Strategy and Structure in British 
Business History, 1950–2000,” Business History 44 (July 2002): 91–124.
10 For the development of U.K. competition policy, see Stephen Wilks, In the Public Inter-
est: Competition Policy and the Monopolies and Mergers Commission (Manchester, U.K., 
1999).
11 The Competition Commission Web site sets out the current role of the various regula-
tory bodies and the law that relates to antitrust and merger provision in the U.K. 
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intense merger-and-acquisition activity, or when an industry has been 
the subject of a series of antitrust inquiries, there are similarly repeated 
interactions between regulators and fi rms. 
Early theories of regulatory capture were established by the econ-
omist George Stigler and then developed further by the legal scholar 
Richard Posner to describe, in its simplest form, the idea that regulators 
could be swayed by “special interests.”12 Stigler’s analysis concerned the 
degree of regulatory favors granted to U.S. railroad companies by dif-
ferent states between 1932 and 1933. Posner presented additional evi-
dence of the infl uence of interest-group pressures on the structure and 
procedures of regulation from his investigation of public utility and 
common-carrier regulations. 
A notable enhancement to the debate on regulatory capture was 
made by the economists Jean-Jacques Laffont and Jean Tirole, who ana-
lyzed capture in an “agency-theoretic framework.” The authors high-
lighted various ways in which interest groups (and fi rms) have the means 
to infl uence public decision makers, ranging from monetary bribes to 
future employment for commissioners and agency staff (the “revolving 
door” phenomenon).13 Their model of the interactions of fi rms and 
agencies with the U.S. Congress considers the regulation of a natural 
monopoly, as observed in many utility industries, where the legal struc-
ture governs the fi rm’s rate of return and price. Similarly, economist 
David Martimort developed a dynamic “game-theory” model to explain 
how capture evolved both across different regulatory agencies and 
within specifi c agencies over time. He argued that while agencies start 
out to protect the public interest, they frequently become ineffi cient, 
bureaucratized, and eager to please private interests.14 
Political economist Ernesto Dal Bó considered a narrower defi ni-
tion of regulatory capture, as the process through which regulated mo-
nopolies end up “manipulating” the state agencies that are supposed to 
control them.15 He pointed out that although most of the literature has 
12 George J. Stigler, “The Theory of Economic Regulation,” Bell Journal of Economics and 
Management Science 2 (Spring 1971): 3–21, proposes as a general hypothesis that every in-
dustry with enough political power to utilize the state will seek to control entry and retard the 
rate of growth of new fi rms. Richard A. Posner, “Theories of Economic Regulation,” Bell 
Journal of Economics and Management Science 5 (Autumn 1974): 335–58, distinguishes 
the “public interest” theory as a response to the demand from the public that markets work 
effi ciently and fairly from a second “capture” theory that is “espoused by an odd mixture of 
welfare state liberals, muckrakers, Marxists and free-market economists.”
13 Jean-Jacques Laffont and Jean Tirole, “The Politics of Government Decision-Making: A 
Theory of Regulatory Capture,” Quarterly Journal of Economics 106 (Nov. 1991): 1089–127.
14 David Martimort, “The Life Cycle of Regulatory Agencies: Dynamic Capture and Trans-
action Costs,” Review of Economic Studies 66 (1999): 929–47, conjectures that capture is en-
forced through repeated interactions.
15 Ernesto Dal Bó, “Regulatory Capture: A Review,” Oxford Review of Economic Policy 22, 
no. 2 (2006): 203–25, discusses political infl uence in the U.S. telecommunications industry.
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focused on utility regulation, a literature on political infl uence has grown 
alongside it, although empirical evidence for a link between political in-
fl uence and regulatory outcomes has remained scarce. While there may 
be no deliberate attempts to manipulate regulation for agency or indus-
try gain in the manner described by Laffont and Tirole, even regulators 
with the best intentions come to see issues through the same lens as the 
industry and fi rms presenting them with information. As British econo-
mist John Kay recently characterized these interactions, the most com-
mon form of regulatory capture is “honest and may be characterized as 
intellectual capture.”16
Outside of these informative insights, there have been few attempts 
to consider the nature of the reciprocal exchanges between fi rms and 
the authorities that oversee antitrust and merger policy. Although at 
fi rst sight it might appear illogical to consider these interactions in the 
context of regulatory capture, it is the case that some nonutility indus-
tries, such as the U.K. supermarket retailers, have been subjects of a se-
ries of antitrust inquiries. Moreover, in industries characterized by in-
tense merger-and-acquisition activity, one or more fi rms may be the 
subject of repeated merger inquiries by the same regulators. Previous 
analysis of the connection between merger activity and political infl u-
ence has focused on studies that utilize cross-sectional datasets, where 
data are investigated for a collection of fi rms at a single point in time 
rather than historically, and therefore have not provided the type of lon-
gitudinal evidence that is needed to investigate either the possibility of 
capture in these processes or the critical role of specifi c entrepreneurs. 
In a controversial analysis of U.S. merger practices, Malcolm Coate, 
Richard Higgins, and Fred McChesney used internal Federal Trade Com-
mission (FTC) fi les on challenged horizontal mergers in order to test 
the hypothesis that U.S. antitrust rulings were politically driven.17 They 
concluded that pressure from politicians (who tend to favor merger 
challenges in order to prevent companies from leaving their jurisdic-
tions) increased the likelihood that the FTC would question proposed 
mergers. Thus, their fi ndings indicated that politics, at least in the 1980s, 
shaped what had traditionally been viewed as an “independent” merger 
policy regime. 
16 John Kay, “Better a Distant Judge Than a Pliant Regulator,” Financial Times, Nov. 3, 
2010.
17 Malcolm B. Coate, Richard S. Higgins, and Fred S. McChesney, “Bureaucracy and Poli-
tics in FTC Merger Challenges,” Journal of Law and Economics 33 (Oct. 1990): 463–82. 
This paper, co-authored by economist Fred McChesney and two former employees of the 
Federal Trade Commission, made use of non-public information taken from internal FTC 
fi les and was obliged to carry a disclaimer stating that the FTC Bureau of Economics had ma-
jor disagreements with the methodology, analysis, inferences, and conclusions contained in 
the paper.
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A similarly thought-provoking analysis of European mergers, by aca-
demic economists Nihat Aktas, Eric de Bodt, and Richard Roll, concluded 
that European merger policy was protectionist, as it was designed to 
protect “privileged” fi rms.18 Their empirical analysis of 290 proposed 
mergers screened by the European regulatory authorities in the 1990s 
showed that intervention was more likely when a leading European 
fi rm’s market position would be challenged by an acquiring entity from 
outside the European Union. This result is supported in a similar eco-
nomic study by Patrice Bougette and Stéphane Turolla of 229 European 
mergers between 1990 and 2005, which found that the type of merger 
remedy proposed (behavioral or structural) differed, depending on the 
fi rm’s industry, the country, and the identity of the European commis-
sioner at the time.19
Considering the possibility of capture during merger transactions 
allows for the possibility that infl uential entrepreneurs could develop 
competitive advantages for their fi rms relative to others within their in-
dustry. There are examples in the business history literature of such re-
lations between entrepreneurs and government agencies. For example, 
as part of their extensive historical analysis of the Anglo-Dutch multi-
national food and toiletries producer and distributor Unilever, Geoffrey 
Jones and Peter Miskell uncovered evidence of the fi rm’s lobbying and 
political infl uence in the early days of the European Union.20 Although 
Unilever did not fund political parties directly, it did provide fi nancial 
support to campaigns that supported entry in countries seeking to join 
the Union. Moreover, they pointed out that one of the fi rm’s chairmen, 
Paul Rijkens, was the only entrepreneurial fi gure to have regularly en-
gaged in high-level meetings with the political establishment of the Eu-
ropean Commission in those early years. It was likely no coincidence 
that efforts to introduce a tax on vegetable oil, which would have nar-
rowed the price differential with butter, did not survive the opposition of 
the Unilever-funded margarine lobby and of various consumer groups. 
In the U.K. brewing industry, the nickname “the Beerage” (“beer” 
plus “peerage”) encapsulates the lobbying power and political infl u-
ence of the leading fi rms, refl ecting the honors bestowed on the family-
led fi rms of the nineteenth century, and alluding to the political funding 
by the brewers in return for favorable treatment through the licensing 
18 Nihat Aktas, Eric de Bodt, and Richard Roll, “Is European M&A Regulation Protection-
ist?” Economic Journal 117 (July 2007): 1096–121.
19 Patrice Bougette and Stéphane Turolla, “Merger Remedies at the European Commis-
sion: A Multinomial Logit Analysis,” MPRA [Munich Personal RePEc Archive] paper 2461 
(Apr. 2007).
20 Geoffrey Jones and Peter Miskell, “European Integration and Corporate Restructur-
ing: The Strategy of Unilever c.1957–c.1990,” Economic History Review 58, no. 1 (2005): 
113–39.
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system. Following passage of the Licensing Act of 1872 by Prime Min-
ister Gladstone’s Liberal government, which restricted opening times 
of public houses and regulated the content of beer, the beer barons 
switched their allegiance to the Conservative Party. The barons re-
mained closely aligned with the Conservatives until the 1990s, by which 
time the political power base of the Beerage was concentrated heavily 
in the hands of the large brewer-retailers. Even recent discussions in 
Parliament point to the long and enduring history of the Beerage in the 
British political system. In a House of Lords debate in 2005, Liberal 
peer Lord McNally made this comment: 
It is a funny old world; it is about 100 years since that great Liberal, 
Sir Winston Churchill, accused the Conservative Party of drawing a 
brewer’s dray across the road of progress. Of course at that time the 
Conservative Benches in this House were known collectively as the 
Beerage. Today, it is the Labour Party that is the brewer’s friend.21
Political donations from the Beerage to the Conservative Party lasted 
well into the 1990s.22 In addition, the large brewers had an infl uential 
voice within the Brewers’ Society, the industry-funded lobbying group 
that represented their collective interests. While the Brewers’ Society 
represented the interests of seventy-seven member fi rms, the mem-
bership of its governing council was such that the group known as the 
Big Seven brewers—Allied-Lyons, Bass, Courage, Guinness, Scottish & 
Newcastle, Whitbread, and Watney Mann—had a permanent major-
ity.23 The Brewers’ Society was described by the MMC during the 1989 
“Beer Orders” investigation as “formidably effective in championing its 
members’ interests.”24 
That the political power of Scottish & Newcastle transcended even 
the general lobbying power of the industry is evident from its merger 
history, which featured the critical role played by its chief executive offi -
cer, Alick Rankin. The recent review of the business history literature 
21 Lords Hansard, 14 Nov. 2005, column 904. [Hansard is the written record of U.K. Par-
liamentary debate, either from the House of Commons or the House of Lords].
22 For example, donations from Allied-Lyons to the Conservative Party in 1991 amounted 
to £110,000, those of Scottish & Newcastle were £50,000 in 1997, and those of Whitbread 
were £15,000 in 1990. Donations ceased after those years.
23 See MMC, “The Supply of Beer: A Report on the Supply of Beer for Retail Sale in the 
United Kingdom,” Cm 654 (1989): 111–12, for details about the members of the Brewers Soci-
ety and its conduct in the inquiry. Following an intense lobbying campaign, the Brewers So-
ciety was credited with forcing the government to partially back down (“Decision on Beer 
O rders,” DTI [Department of Trade and Industry] Press Notice 89/745). 
24 Hansard, 15 Feb. 1995. In a debate on extending Sunday trading hours, Donald Ander-
son, Labour MP for Swansea, East made this comment: “the brewers were becoming pretty 
unhappy with the performance of what they deemed to be their Government, and the Gov-
ernment hoped to win back the support of the brewers, which, after all, had provided 10 per 
cent of Conservative party funds at the previous general election.”
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by Geoffrey Jones and R. Daniel Wadhwani has opened the possibility 
of debate about the role of individuals in politics and regulatory con-
duct. In our consideration, the actions of businessmen like Alick Rankin 
and his adversary, Elders IXL’s John Elliott, in the bitter fi ght for Scot-
tish & Newcastle during regulatory negotiations are examples of profes-
sional managers operating as modern entrepreneurs in the sense dis-
cussed by historians Teresa da Silva Lopes and Mark Casson.25 These 
managers are the agents who act as conduits between their fi rms’ vari-
ous stakeholders and the external environment.
Alick Rankin’s role in navigating Scottish & Newcastle through its 
transformation from a regional to an international brewer supplies the 
template for the fi rm’s success in implementing its subsequent merg-
ers. Scottish & Newcastle’s corporate evolution illustrates how political 
acumen, combined with a grasp of the regulatory framework, conferred 
a competitive advantage—albeit one that was ultimately transitory—on 
this fi rm in a consolidating industry. The management of Scottish & 
Newcastle adapted to the changing economic and political environment 
in a manner that enabled the fi rm to eclipse its major competitors.
Scottish & Newcastle: Developing a Growth 
Strategy Based on Mergers
At the time of the publication of the fi rst antitrust investigation into 
the U.K. brewing industry in 1969, the Big Six major brewer-retailers 
accounted for nearly 70 percent of British beer production. (See Table 1.) 
Together with Guinness (a major Anglo-Irish brewer, but unlike the 
other majors, one that did not own a tied pub estate), these seven fi rms 
(the Big Seven) dominated the British brewing industry. As one of the 
smaller of the Big Six brewer-retailers, Scottish & Newcastle controlled 
a limited estate of tied houses (retailing outlets that the brewer either 
owned directly or controlled through a tenancy agreement), owing to 
the larger incidence of free-trade sales that traditionally characterized 
the Scottish beer market. 
25 Geoffrey Jones and R. Daniel Wadhwani, “Entrepreneurship and Business History: Re-
newing the Research Agenda,” Harvard Business School working paper 07-007 (2006), con-
clude that there are opportunities for advancing understanding of the historical role of cul-
ture and values on entrepreneurial behavior and the role of institutions in economic growth 
by exploring the precise relation between institutions and entrepreneurs. Teresa da Silva 
Lopes and Mark Casson, “Entrepreneurship and the Development of Global Brands,” Busi-
ness History Review 81 (Winter 2007): 651–80, distinguish between a “traditional” entre-
preneur that fl ourished in the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries and an “ex-
panded” version of an entrepreneur that emerged in the mid-twentieth century, when 
professional managers were recruited to manage fi rms that now relied on external share-
holders for capital.
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The market shares of the leading brewers refl ected their regional 
strengths, as only a handful of beer brands, such as Guinness, bottled 
Bass, and Worthington, could be considered “national.”26 This was the 
period prior to the emergence of lager as an important beer category in 
England and Wales. Regional taste preferences, coupled with the diffi -
culties in transporting draft ales, had limited the scope for developing 
national brands; in total, there were still around three thousand differ-
ent brands in the late 1960s.
In a defi nitive historical analysis of the U.K. beer market, Gourvish 
and Wilson ascribe the factors leading to the series of regional mergers 
that created the Big Six as a combination of “defensive anxiety . . . and 
the search for national status through the acquisition of retail outlets. 
Emulation of others was also important.”27 Moreover, the arrival of 
new entrants, both from overseas (the aggressive Canadian United 
Breweries, controlled by E. P. Taylor) and at home (property developer 
Charles Clore’s failed 1959 hostile bid for Watney Mann), the latter at-
tracted by perceived underperforming assets in key city centers, re-
minded the U.K.’s foremost brewers of the need to protect and expand 
their bases.
Table 1
The Principal U.K. Brewers in 1967
Firm
Production 
(m barrels)
Market Share
(%)
Bass Charrington  5.64  18.1
Allied Breweries  4.83  15.5
Whitbread  3.46  11.1
Watney Mann  2.94   9.4
Scottish & Newcastle  2.51   8.0
Courage Barclay & Simonds  1.78   5.7
 Total “Big Six” 21.16  67.8
Arthur Guinness  1.53   4.9
Next 11 brewers  4.46  14.3
Final 93 brewers  4.06  13.0
  Total U.K. 31.20 100.0
Source: Monopolies Commission, “Beer: A Report on the Supply of Beer,” 1969.
26 MMC, “Beer: A Report on the Supply of Beer,” HC [House of Commons] 216 (1969): 7, 
cites Mr. J. A. P. Charrington, president of Bass Charrington, in the Times, 22 Apr. 1968, in 
ascribing regional taste preferences that underpinned the regional nature of the U.K. brewing 
industry. 
27 Gourvish and Wilson, The British Brewing Industry.
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During the 1960s, complaints of anticompetitive behavior began to 
surface in the industry in response to the powerful market positions of 
the major brewers. With the exception of Guinness, these fi rms had verti-
cally integrated businesses that encompassed brewing, wholesaling, 
and retailing. The MMC report identifi ed adverse public interest issues 
growing out of the industry’s vertically integrated structure and the na-
tional brewers’ collective power. In the early 1970s, only two outsiders 
managed to enter the industry (Imperial Group and Grand Metropoli-
tan), which they accomplished by acquiring two of the Big Six brewer-
retailers. Any ambition to embark on a merger was limited by the pros-
pect of further antitrust pressure, with the result that only piecemeal 
consolidation of small family brewers occurred at this time.28 The larger 
brewers were content to follow the corporate growth trend that pre-
vailed in Britain during the 1970s, which entailed diversifying into other 
business sectors, such as food manufacturing, retailing, and leisure.
For its own part, Scottish & Newcastle pursued an organic growth 
strategy during the 1970s, designed to extend its base in Scotland and 
the Northeast of England southward. The strategy was initially success-
ful, but as beer consumption declined nationally during the recession of 
the late 1970s, rival brewers responded aggressively, and Scottish & 
Newcastle’s beer sales also declined.29 Thus, as the 1980s progressed, 
the fi rm abandoned its organic approach to growth and adopted a strat-
egy of acquisition while continuing to work toward its aim of becoming 
a fully fl edged national brewer. (The main merger events in the history 
of Scottish & Newcastle prior to 1995, and the Courage acquisition, are 
shown in Table 2.) 
The transformation of Scottish & Newcastle into the United King-
dom’s leading brewer was largely propelled by the elevation of Alick 
Rankin to the role of chief executive offi cer in 1983. Rankin held this 
position until 1989, when he became group chairman, combining that 
role with other external appointments, such as chair of the Brewers’ So-
ciety. Rankin’s impact was “rapid and profound”: the fi rm’s shift toward 
acquisitive growth commenced in 1984 with negotiations to acquire the 
Hartlepool-based company J. W. Cameron, the ailing brewing subsidiary 
of industrial conglomerate Ellerman Group, which controlled 460 pub-
lic houses and owned the Lion Brewery.30 Surprisingly, however, this 
initial attempt to grow through acquisition was referred to the MMC and 
28 Price Commission, “Beer Prices and Margins,” report no. 31 (1977), points to the ad-
verse effect on beer prices of a combination of high concentration and vertical integration in 
the brewing industry, reinforced by restrictive licensing laws.
29 In MMC, “Scottish & Newcastle Breweries plc and Matthew Brown plc” (1985): 16; 
Scottish & Newcastle’s 1985 beer sales being some 20 percent below their 1975–76 peak.
30 “Obituary: Sir Alick Rankin,” Independent, 6 Aug. 1999.
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subsequently abandoned by Rankin. Given the relatively small sizes of 
both fi rms and the limited geographic overlap in the pub estates, the 
reasons for the bid’s referral are unclear. According to one view, lobby-
ing by the Campaign for Real Ale (CAMRA), an independent, voluntary 
organization that champions the rights of consumers in relation to the 
U.K. and European beer and drinks industry, was a decisive factor in 
the decision.31 
Informed by the failure of its fi rst notable acquisition attempt, Scot-
tish & Newcastle announced a hostile bid for the Lancashire-based fi rm 
of Matthew Brown in March 1985. Matthew Brown was one of the larger 
and more successful of the regional brewers that had grown by acquisi-
tion in northwest England, eventually extending eastward into York-
shire with the acquisition of Theakston. Its assets comprised four brew-
eries and 525 tied public houses. The offer document to Matthew 
Brown’s shareholders reveals that Scottish & Newcastle, which had al-
ready amassed a 13 percent shareholding in its target, warned that re-
gional brewers like Matthew Brown would fi nd it increasingly diffi cult 
to survive on their own in the fi ercely competitive domestic beer mar-
ket. In the document, Scottish & Newcastle argued that the merger would 
offer new commercial opportunities to Matthew Brown that would guar-
antee its future.
This acquisition was also referred to the MMC on April 24, 1985. 
Scottish & Newcastle argued that integration with Matthew Brown pre-
sented a means of strengthening its ability to compete more effectively 
31 See Campaign for Real Ale [CAMRA], Opening Times, no. 139 (2009): 6.
Table 2
Scottish & Newcastle: Brewery Mergers, 1984–1995
Year Event
1984 Acquisition of JW Cameron abandoned following referral to MMC
1985 Launched hostile bid for Matthew Brown
1986 Acquired Home Brewery for £123m
1987 Acquired Matthew Brown for £118m
1988 Received hostile approach from Elders IXL, owner of Courage
1989 Elders IXL hostile bid for S&N blocked by MMC
1993 Acquired Chef & Brewer managed pub estate for £628.5m from Grand 
Metropolitan
1995 Acquired Courage for £430m (included Foster’s European distribution rights)
Source: Scottish & Newcastle; Julie Bower, “Strategic Interactions with Competition Authori-
ties in the U.K. Alcoholic Beverages Industry,” PhD thesis, University of Warwick, 2007; 
prices paid were actual at the time of the acquisition.
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with the other fi ve national brewer-retailers, in addition to the regional 
brewers. The national brewer-retailers each controlled between 5,000 
and 7,000 tied outlets, whereas Scottish & Newcastle controlled a mere 
1,450 and Matthew Brown owned 525. Although its size and demon-
strated ability to compete successfully in the free trade gave the fi rm a 
competitive advantage over the nationals, Scottish & Newcastle pleaded 
to the MMC that it needed both to establish a larger platform in the 
Northwest and in Yorkshire and to gain access to Matthew Brown’s En-
glish heritage ale brands, in order to strengthen its own ale portfolio. 
Signifi cantly, the proposal had the backing of the Industry Depart-
ment of Scotland, a government department, which stated its belief that 
the ability of a rejuvenated Scottish & Newcastle to become more com-
petitive with its main rivals would be in the interests of both the indus-
try and consumers. The Scottish offi cials were of the opinion that any 
adverse effect on employment resulting from brewery closures would 
be brief and should be weighed against the longer-term prospects for 
growth and prosperity that the merged entity would offer.32 Scottish 
political interests strongly supported a Scottish fi rm’s effort to compete 
on a level playing fi eld with its English rivals. Indeed, in a speech to the 
Scottish Conservative Conference in 1984, Prime Minister Margaret 
Thatcher made special reference to the secretary of state for Scotland at 
the time, stating, “Nobody stands up for Scotland more than George 
Younger.”33 George (later Viscount) Younger was descended from the 
famous brewing families of William Younger and William McEwan that 
formed the Scottish half of Scottish & Newcastle. Other government de-
partments declined invitations to make representations about the 
merger, including the Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food (the 
sponsoring department for the brewing industry), the Home Offi ce, and 
Her Majesty’s Customs and Excise. The Department of Employment 
merely stated that the prospect of increased unemployment did not of 
itself warrant fi nding against the merger proposal.
In reviewing the possible impact of this merger, the MMC was par-
ticularly concerned about how it would affect regional competition. 
Once free-trade outlets with exclusive supply contracts were included in 
the analysis, the commission argued that the fi rms’ joint market share 
in North and West Cumbria would rise from just under a third to around 
50 percent. However, while the MMC considered this prospect prob-
lematic, it ultimately accepted the argument put forward by Scottish & 
32 While many third parties were against the merger, in particular those representing in-
terests in the Northwest, others including two Newcastle MPs held supporting views. MMC, 
“Scottish & Newcastle Breweries plc and Matthew Brown plc,” 56–57.
33 Margaret Thatcher Foundation, Margaret Thatcher’s speech to the Scottish Conserva-
tive Conference, 11 May 1984.
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Newcastle that the issue of increased share would be offset by the rela-
tive ease with which free-trade contractors would be able to switch 
suppliers.34
In its concluding remarks, the MMC summarized the public inter-
est arguments that had been addressed in the case, issuing pointers on 
how subsequent mergers might be considered. Referring to earlier fi nd-
ings by the Price Commission that the existing combination of high con-
centration and vertical integration in the brewing industry had made 
new entry diffi cult, the MMC noted that the objective of enhancing com-
petition among national tied estate brewers was a pressing matter of 
public interest. The proposed merger was therefore approved on the 
grounds that it would assist the ability of Scottish & Newcastle to com-
pete with the other Big Six national brewer-retailers.35
A strong emotional consideration in MMC investigations at this 
time was the prospect that mergers would have an impact on local em-
ployment opportunities. Drawing on the public interest provision, Mat-
thew Brown’s advisers had argued vociferously that, if the bid pro-
ceeded, jobs would be lost across the region as a result of some or all of 
its breweries being closed. In its submission to the MMC, Scottish & 
Newcastle gave assurances “categorically, publicly, and in writing that 
without any question whatsoever the Blackburn and Masham breweries 
[of Matthew Brown] are sacrosanct for continued brewing purposes.”36 
No such assurances were given, however, on the Cumbrian-based brew-
eries at Carlisle and Workington that employed collectively some 170 
people.37 Although the bid was cleared in November 1985, it took more 
than a year of negotiations between the parties before the deal was con-
summated in early 1987. The long drawn-out acquisition of Matthew 
Brown represented for Alick Rankin and his team a unique learning ex-
perience, as it enabled them to become familiar with the merger poli-
cies that were in place at the time and with the mechanism of fi ghting a 
hostile bid in the public eye. The experience had been an opportunity 
for the management to present and argue its case to the MMC—that the 
34 The traditional vertically integrated structure of the U.K. beer market was underpinned 
by a property tie. The brewers owned licensed premises, both managed and tenanted, where 
only their brands were sold. However, a major part of the free trade was also tied to the large 
national brewers by way of loans, often at levels considerably below market interest rates in 
return for various buying obligations. 
35 MMC, “Scottish & Newcastle Breweries plc and Matthew Brown plc,” 64.
36 Ibid., 66.
37 In an Adjournment debate, Jack Straw, Labour MP for Blackburn, pointed to the “fl a-
grant breach of categorical undertakings to keep open the Blackburn brewery given by Scot-
tish & Newcastle to the Monopolies and Mergers Commission in 1985 and repeated on many 
subsequent occasions in 1987, 1988 and 1989. The question raised by Scottish & Newcastle’s 
conduct is identical to that which arose in the takeover of Distillers by Guinness.” Hansard, 
22 Nov. 1990. 
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U.K. beer market needed a strengthened free trade–oriented supplier 
like Scottish & Newcastle as a counterforce to the major national verti-
cally integrated brewers—and gave the fi rm the chance to garner gen-
eral pointers from the regulators on how to apply the public interest 
provision in future brewery mergers. How far the fi rm had honed these 
crucial skills was put to the test two years later, when the Australian 
company, Elders IXL, sought to strengthen its base in the United King-
dom ahead of staging an assault on mainland Europe. 
Regulatory Capture and the Entry of 
Elders IXL into the U.K. Market 
In 1983, Elders IXL, one of Australia’s largest fi rms, entered its do-
mestic brewing industry via the acquisition of Carlton United Breweries 
(CUB), producer of Foster’s lager and one of the country’s duopoly 
brewers, representing a market share of 47 percent. Elders’ ambitious 
management, led by former McKinsey management consultant John 
Elliott, believed that the U.K. beer market was ripe for rationalization.38 
He recognized that the beer industry was becoming increasingly inter-
national and sought to use Britain as the platform for expanding into 
Europe. In October 1985, Elders IXL launched a hostile bid for the di-
versifi ed British brewing fi rm Allied-Lyons. Elders’ bid was referred to 
the MMC on December 5, 1985, by Secretary of State for Trade and In-
dustry Leon Brittan, who was concerned, rather unusually, that the bid-
der’s use of substantial fi nancial leverage was a matter of public inter-
est. Although the bid was eventually cleared by the MMC in September 
1986, the lengthy inquiry gave Allied-Lyons’ management enough time 
to embark on its own “poison pill” acquisition strategy. Allied initiated 
its plan by buying control of the major Canadian spirits fi rm Hiram 
Walker and then wooing City fi nancial analysts with an invitation to visit 
—on a specially chartered Concorde fl ight—its newly acquired North 
American operations.39 The combination of the time delay, the strong 
City backing, and the increased size and complexity of the Allied-Lyons 
enterprise were more than suffi cient to dissuade Elders IXL from con-
tinuing its approach, notwithstanding the bid’s eventual clearance by 
the MMC. 
Unwilling to be diverted from its U.K. and European strategic ob-
jectives, in November 1986 Elders IXL bid successfully in the auction 
38 Sir Alick Rankin’s obituary noted that Elders IXL was “not conspicuously constrained 
by the fi ner points of British market etiquette.” Independent, 6 Aug. 1999.
39 “Drinks analysts wistfully recall the heady 1980s when Allied Domecq hired Concorde 
for a week, and fl ew them all to whisky distilleries in Scotland, Canada, America and France; 
‘I think that marked the peak,’ says one.” Telegraph, 24 June 2000.
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for the brewing fi rm Courage, which had become available as an orphan 
asset following Hanson Trust’s acquisition of Imperial Tobacco.40 With 
the takeover of Courage completed, Elders IXL contacted Scottish & 
Newcastle to propose forming a national distribution system, motivated 
by consideration of the complementary nature of Courage’s southern-
based brewing and pub estate and the northern focus of Scottish & 
Newcastle’s assets. The debate extended to an agreed merger of the two 
beer businesses under Scottish & Newcastle’s control. However, in an 
attempt to speed the transaction, Elders IXL began to buy shares in 
Scottish & Newcastle. The two companies held further rounds of meet-
ings, during which time Elders’ management further increased its fi rm’s 
shareholding in Scottish & Newcastle. When no agreement was reached 
between the parties, Elders launched a £1.6 billion hostile bid on Octo-
ber 17, 1988. 
The Elders bid for Scottish & Newcastle was referred to the MMC on 
November 9, 1988. Two days earlier, Scottish & Newcastle had published 
its defense document, in which it pointed to an “already overgeared” El-
ders IXL balance sheet—the reason for the secretary of state’s decision 
to refer Elders’ earlier hostile bid for Allied-Lyons—and stated, “Cour-
age is now poorly positioned for the future. It is trying to buy the suc-
cess that it will fi nd hard to achieve through organic growth.”41 The true 
irony of these arguments only became apparent seven years later, when 
Scottish & Newcastle directly acquired Courage. 
Scottish & Newcastle’s auditor, Arthur Young, provided a detailed 
balance-sheet analysis of Elders IXL, supporting the view that the bid 
amounted to a highly leveraged deal that should be referred, and possi-
bly blocked. The defense document was bolstered by helpful comments 
from the City and from leading newspapers. The Financial Times con-
cluded, “The deal is a straight forward fi nancial manoeuvre.”42 Scottish & 
Newcastle mustered support from all offi cial quarters in its defense. 
Supportive submissions to the inquiry were made by the Industrial De-
partment of Scotland, the Scottish Development Agency, Scottish Finan-
cial Enterprise, Scottish Trades Union Congress and various regional 
chapters of trade unions, the Bank of Scotland, and a host of Scottish 
MPs spanning all political parties. The Scottish Council on Alcohol re-
corded its view that the social awareness shown by Scottish & Newcastle 
regarding the alcohol abuse debate might be “jeopardized if the merger 
proceeded” (thereby suggesting that the Australian fi rm had less social 
40 Imperial bought Courage in 1972 as part of its strategy of diversifying away from 
tobacco.
41 “Scottish & Newcastle Breweries plc Support a Successful Company—Reject the Elders 
Offers,” [Scottish & Newcastle defense document] 7 Nov. 1988, 3.
42 The Lex Column, Financial Times, 12 May 1988, 5.
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awareness).43 Against this array of forces, the Bank of England made a 
written submission stating that neither the fi nancing of Elders IXL nor 
the resulting merged entity raised material concerns about either com-
petition or the public interest.
The actions of Elders IXL directed toward the U.K. Takeover Code 
were aggressive by British standards. On the morning of the referral, 
Elders bought more shares in the stock market, increasing its holding 
in Scottish & Newcastle almost to 24 percent. This action prompted 
Secretary of State for Trade and Industry Lord Young to take the un-
precedented step of ordering a freeze of the shareholding and limiting 
Elders’ voting rights to 15 percent of the equity. Elders justifi ed its ac-
tions on the basis that they were designed to stop Scottish & Newcastle 
from instigating an Allied-style “poison pill” strategy during the course 
of the MMC investigation. Moreover, Elders claimed that its actions did 
not breach the Substantial Acquisition Rules of the Fair Trading Act. 
Nonetheless, during the course of Elders’ bid, Scottish & Newcastle 
spent £115 million to acquire the Pontin’s holiday park business. The 
Pontin’s management team later recalled, “Scottish & Newcastle were 
under threat from Elders IXL, which had launched a bid and S&N wanted 
to buy a U.K. leisure business. . . . It was a sort of poison pill.”44
The MMC concluded that the merger of Elders IXL and Scottish & 
Newcastle would undermine the public interest, on the grounds that it 
would lead to the loss of the independence of one of the major suppliers 
to the market. The decision, which emphasized mainly the competition 
in free-trade pubs (i.e., pubs not tied to a brewer), was made despite 
written submission by the two major supermarket groups, Tesco and 
Sainsbury, that no such adverse consumer impact would result from 
the merger. The commission’s reason for blocking the merger is signifi -
cant on two counts. First, during the MMC inquiry into the Matthew 
Brown merger bid, Scottish & Newcastle had itself argued successfully 
that free-trade supply contracts were irrelevant because those contracts 
readily changed hands. Second, by the mid-1980s, sales in the take-
home trade, which was increasingly dominated by the supermarkets, 
represented more than 15 percent of the total beer market, a fi gure that 
approximately equaled the business conducted by free-trade pubs.45 El-
ders IXL’s unsuccessful hostile bid for Scottish & Newcastle in 1989 co-
incided with the publication of the MMC’s detailed multiyear investi-
gation of competition in the U.K. beer market, which culminated in 
43 MMC, “Elders IXL Ltd. and Scottish & Newcastle Breweries plc: A Report on the Merger 
Situations,” Cm 654 (1989): 94. 
44 ‘Parr is taking another punt on Pontin’s’, Daily Telegraph, 30 Mar. 2008, 2.
45 MMC, “The Supply of Beer” (1989): 31. 
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what became known as the Beer Orders. In its investigation, the MMC 
concluded that a complex monopoly favored brewers that owned tied 
houses, or who had loan-tied agreements (at reduced interest rates) 
with free houses, restricting the growth of brewers without tied estates. 
The MMC recommended that a ceiling of two thousand tied on-license 
outlets should be placed on any one brewery group, and that loan tying 
should be eliminated in order to “restore a substantial measure of gen-
uine freedom to the ‘free’ trade.”46 
The decision to block the Elders IXL bid was published on March 8, 
1989, in the same month as the publication of the antitrust enquiry. 
Members of the Elders IXL investigation team at the MMC, while ac-
knowledging that they had been given an advance copy of the antitrust 
report, stated that they had reached their decision on the merger based 
only on the evidence in front of it. Yet the degree of industry lobbying 
and political intervention that occurred over the course of the Beer Or-
ders enquiry was clearly extensive, making it diffi cult to imagine that 
the Elders bid inquiry operated in a vacuum, unaffected by political con-
siderations. Had the MMC decided not to recommend that the merger 
be blocked, it is likely that the secretary of state could have been per-
suaded to countermand its decision, given the powerful political con-
nections of Alick Rankin (and his team) to important players in the 
Conservative Party.
In response to the MMC’s ruling against its bid for Scottish & New-
castle, Elders’ management issued general criticisms of the British brew-
ing industry’s restrictive structure and operation and suggested that the 
industry was subject to an unwarranted degree of political interest. The 
managers stated their opinion that the industry “attracted an unusual 
amount of sentimental interest which should not be confused with gen-
uine public interest issues. . . . [and] was highly regulated and very 
‘political.’ ”47
Both the relative market shares, shown in Table 3, and the falling 
trend in beer consumption patterns in the United Kingdom implied 
that rationalization of supply through merger activity would become 
an economic inevitability. Annual U.K. beer consumption peaked at 
forty-two million barrels in 1979 and then declined to thirty-fi ve mil-
lion barrels by the end of the 1990s.48 The Brewers’ Society pointed to 
“substantial excess capacity for ale production and substantial new in-
vestment in lager production facilities.”49 Estimates from within the 
46 Ibid., 5. 
47 MMC, “Elders IXL Ltd. and Scottish & Newcastle Breweries plc,” 63–64.
48 Bower, “Strategic Interactions,” shows U.K. beer consumption from 1899 to 2004 in 
Table 2.3.
49 MMC, “The Supply of Beer,” 118.
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industry suggested that overcapacity in U.K. brewing exceeded ten mil-
lion barrels at the time of the Beer Orders enquiry.50 The ongoing shift 
in consumption from traditional ale to lager underpinned the arguments 
for rationalizing capacity and consequently for consolidation among ex-
isting fi rms.
The political pressures that advanced a decision to block the Elders 
bid were laid bare in retrospective accounts of the episode. In mourning 
the demise of Scottish & Newcastle, which occurred in 2007, the Her-
ald Scotland commented as follows:
In constructing a defence of his company, Rankin played a political 
blinder. First, despite some rather fl imsy evidence on market over-
lap between S&N and Courage . . . he succeeded in getting the Elders 
bid referred. . . . There were suggestions at the time that Buck House 
[Buckingham Palace] had dropped a few supportive hints in appro-
priate ears.51 
The article went on to discuss the close link between Scottish & New-
castle and the Conservative Party in Scotland and to explore the fi rm’s 
status as that nation’s largest manufacturing company.
The ability of Scottish & Newcastle to invoke the right of the politi-
cal (Conservative Party) machine to interfere directly in regulatory out-
comes is well documented. The nature of the relations between the MMC 
and the secretary of state in the U.K. merger regime of the 1980s and 
Table 3
The Principal Producers of Beer in 1985
Brewer
Production 
(m barrels)
Market Share 
(%)
Bass  8.4  22.9
Allied-Lyons  4.7  12.8
Whitbread  4.0  11.0
Scottish & Newcastle  3.9  10.6
Watney (Grand Met)  3.2   8.8
Courage (Elders)  3.2   8.7
 Total Big Six 27.3  74.8
 Total U.K. 36.6 100.0
Source: Monopolies and Mergers Commission, “The Supply of Beer: A Report on the Supply 
of Beer for Retail Sale in the United Kingdom,” 1989.
50 MMC, “Elders IXL Ltd. and Grand Metropolitan plc: A Report on the Merger Situa-
tions,” Cm 1227 (1990): 11–12, gives estimates of capacity utilization for the major U.K. 
brewers. 
51 “Who Will Toast Victory in the Brewing Beer Wars,” Herald Scotland, 19 Oct. 2007.
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1990s suggests extensive political infl uence over the MMC’s enquiries; 
the secretary’s overriding authority gave him enough leeway to infl u-
ence the MMC’s deliberations and indirectly leading to capture. How-
ever, even if this were not the case, it is possible to conjecture that by 
the time Scottish & Newcastle appeared before the MMC with its de-
fense against the Elders hostile bid, it had, at the very least, gained a 
better understanding of how the inquiry would proceed and of which 
arguments would fi nd favor with the MMC. In all, the history of Scot-
tish & Newcastle’s merger-based growth strategy appears to offer a clear 
example of the process of intellectual capture as postulated by Kay. 
Postscript: The 1995 Courage Reverse Merger
Having escaped the clutches of Elders IXL, Scottish & Newcastle 
was in the fortunate and unique position among the Big Six of not hav-
ing an estate of tied houses that was suffi ciently large to require divest-
ment in order to comply with the terms of the Beer Orders. Since the 
Beer Orders were undermining the vertically integrated structure of the 
U.K. brewing market, the remaining members of the Big Six were forced 
to consider alternative options for their British operations.52 Having 
undergone two failed mergers, it is not surprising that Courage’s par-
ent, Elders IXL, was an early mover in developing a new beer strategy. 
On March 12, 1990, Elders IXL and Grand Met (its U.K. beer distribu-
tion partner) announced their agreement to swap brewing and pub 
assets through a complex three-stage process.53 The following year, 
A llied-Lyons announced that it was merging its U.K. brewing opera-
tions with those of Carlsberg AS to form Carlsberg-Tetley Ltd. Both 
deals were designed to improve brewing effi ciency at a time when beer 
consumption was declining, particularly in the pub trade.54
As the 1990s progressed, both Allied-Lyons and Grand Met saw 
their futures moving into the international spirits industry. Whitbread 
52 Terry R. Gourvish, “Mergers and the British Brewing Industry,” in Management and 
Business in Britain and France (1995), eds. Y. Cassis, F. Crouzet, and T.R. Gourvish, Claren-
don Press, U.K., refers to a market strategy for all the major brewers, except Guinness, that 
from 1880 to 1900 was based on the acquisition of existing fi rms to build vertically integrated 
structures.
53 Courage acquired the brewing assets of Grand Met. Grand Met took a 50 percent share-
holding in the Courage tenanted pub operation, renamed Inntrepreneur Estates Ltd. (IEL), 
and injected its 3,565 tenanted pubs. Both the wholly owned Grand Met–managed pubs and 
IEL signed ten-year exclusive supply contracts to Courage, subsequently revised to fi ve years 
to comply with EU law.
54 In MMC, “Elders IXL Ltd. and Grand Metropolitan Plc” (1990): 35–36, Courage gave 
evidence of readily attainable effi ciencies. In MMC, “Allied-Lyons plc and Carlsberg A/S: A 
Report on the Proposed Joint Venture,” Cm 2029 (1992): 44, there is broad agreement with 
Courage on the strong buying power of the multiple grocers and the potential for consider-
able effi ciency savings in both beer production and distribution. 
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and Bass, both confi dent in their competitive advantage in the United 
Kingdom, made no move to consolidate their operations, either in brew-
ing or retailing, ignoring the efforts of countless corporate fi nanciers. In 
fact, the need for further consolidation in brewing was becoming evi-
dent from the operating return trajectory of the industry’s major 
brewer-retailers during the 1990s. (See Figure 1.)55 
On May 18, 1995, Scottish & Newcastle made the surprise an-
nouncement that it had agreed to buy Courage from Fosters Group, the 
renamed Elders IXL, for £425 million. Through this acquisition, Scot-
tish & Newcastle gained not only the brewing rights to Foster’s in Brit-
ain and continental Europe but also, crucially, leadership of the U.K. 
brewing market. With close to a 30 percent market share, it was seven 
percentage points higher than the long-term market leader Bass, and it 
Figure 1. Operating returns of major U.K. brewer-retailers. (Source: Julie Bower, “Strategic 
Interactions with Competition Authorities in the U.K. Alcoholic Beverages Industry,” PhD 
thesis, University of Warwick 2007, Figure 5.2, compiled from published fi nancial data in an-
nual reports and accounts of Allied Domecq, Bass, Scottish & Newcastle and Whitbread, 
1990–2000.)
55 Figure 1 depicts the Big Six at the time of the 1995 merger of Scottish & Newcastle and 
Courage. In aggregate they accounted for approximately 80 percent of U.K. production. 
Guinness was categorized separately, in “Brewers without Tied Estate” in the 1989 MMC 
inquiry, which, in aggregate, accounted for 8 percent of U.K. production and is omitted 
from this chart; it was not a vertically integrated U.K. brewer and its major focus was outside 
the U.K.
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had also acquired some of Britain’s leading beer brands and most effi -
cient breweries.56 The management team, now led by Brian Stewart, 
with Sir Alick Rankin as chairman, outlined the rationale for the acqui-
sition as essentially one of geographic expansion: the acquisition of a 
“complementary portfolio of national and regional brands,” coupled 
with opportunities for establishing cost leadership through “substantial 
operating economies of scale.”57 In reality, having acquired the Chef & 
Brewer pub chain from Grand Met some two years earlier as a platform 
for growth in London and the Southeast, Scottish & Newcastle recog-
nized not only the signifi cance of the Courage brands that supplied that 
estate but also, de facto, the weakness of its own existing brand port-
folio to supply the pubs when the Courage supply contract expired in 
March 1995.58
From the outset, the management of Scottish & Newcastle was 
confi dent that the merger would proceed unchallenged on the basis of 
“soundings” that had been taken from the Offi ce of Fair Trading.59 The 
merger was duly transacted as planned, without a referral for MMC in-
vestigation, notwithstanding its breach of the 25 percent market-share 
threshold. With the Conservative Party’s term in offi ce coming to an 
end in May 1997, a Scottish fi rm that had previously fared well in the 
competition policy sphere was, perhaps, the only big brewer that was 
suffi ciently bold—and well connected—to attempt to breach the hori-
zontal market share “rule.” Various debates in the House of Commons 
made it clear that a future Labour government would offer few favors, 
either to Scottish & Newcastle or to the Beerage in general.60 The threat 
to the industry of a more powerful Scottish & Newcastle forced an al-
most immediate reappraisal of strategies at the remaining national 
brewer retailers. As the regulatory regime seemed prepared to entertain 
greater horizontal integration, complete dismantling of the vertical tie 
now seemed a realistic prospect. With the benefi t of hindsight, the chal-
lenge became to conduct transactions while the Conservatives were still 
in offi ce.
56 The acquisition gave Scottish & Newcastle two of the U.K.’s leading beer brands, 
F oster’s and John Smith’s, that collectively accounted for nearly 30 percent of Courage’s vol-
ume. Foster’s was the second largest lager brand in the U.K. The deal also added modern and 
relatively more effi cient plants at Reading and Tadcaster to add to the existing brewery and 
then state-of-the-art canning line in Edinburgh. 
57 “Scottish & Newcastle plc Proposed Acquisition of the Courage Business and Rights Is-
sue,” Listing Particulars document (1995): 8.
58 “Scottish & Newcastle plc: Proposed Acquisition of the Chef & Brewer Estate and Rights 
Issue,” Listing Particulars document (1993): 4.
59 Julie Bower attended the analyst briefi ng on the day of the merger announcement.
60 Matthew Brown Brewery, Adjournment debate called by Mr Jack Straw, Labour MP for 
Blackburn, Hansard, 22 Nov. 1990. 
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Bass, the market leader in the United Kingdom since the 1960s, 
had been pursuing an organic growth strategy for its domestic brewing 
operation; its market share of 23 percent severely restricted options for 
growth by acquisition. During the early 1990s, Bass came under strong 
pressure from its shareholders to simplify its structure and develop a 
cohesive group strategy for its core businesses of brewing, pub retail-
ing, and hotels. During this debate, it abruptly lost its U.K. market lead-
ership position to Scottish & Newcastle. On August 25, 1996, Bass an-
nounced that, conditional on regulatory approval, it was merging its 
brewing operations with those of Carlsberg-Tetley by acquiring Allied 
Domecq’s 50 percent stake.61 The proposed merger was referred to the 
MMC and, in June 1997, given provisional clearance based on a major-
ity decision.62 However, the publication of the fi ndings corresponded 
with a change in government, and the new (Labour Party) secretary of 
state for trade and industry, Margaret Beckett, blocked the merger. Fol-
lowing this decision, Bass embarked on a full-scale restructuring of its 
portfolio of businesses that led, in 2000, to its exit from U.K. brewing 
through a £2.3 billion sale to Belgian brewer, Interbrew, owner of the 
Stella Artois brand. 
At the same time, Whitbread was also considering its strategy in 
light of the new Beer Orders operating environment and in response to 
the strategic moves of its close competitors. Its survival as a fi rst-division 
national brewer had long been questioned, largely due to the fi rm’s reli-
ance on the British license agreements for Heineken and Stella Artois. 
The Whitbread Brewing Company (WBC) was gradually phased down 
within the group and, in May 1999, Whitbread signaled that it was stak-
ing its future fi rmly on leisure and retailing with the announcement 
that it had agreed to buy Allied Domecq’s U.K. pub and off-license as-
sets for £2.36 billion. Simultaneously, and mindful of regulatory re-
quirements, Whitbread announced that it would divest its brewing 
operations when the acquisition was completed. Surprisingly, the Of-
fi ce of Fair Trading advised the secretary of state to refer the bid to the 
MMC’s successor, the Competition Commission.63 Whitbread decided 
to abandon the acquisition, although it carried through its objective of 
61 Bass Carlsberg Tetley would have created the U.K.’s largest brewer with 37 percent 
market share of beer production and a tied estate of 4,400 pubs. 
62 MMC, “Bass plc, Carlsberg A/S and Carlsberg-Tetley plc: A Report on the Merger Situa-
tion,” Cm 3662 (1997): 30, noted that Professor Newbery, while fully accepting the public in-
terest fi ndings, was not persuaded that the proposed remedy would adequately address the 
substantial increase in market power accruing to BCT.
63 “The bid by brewery giant Whitbread for the pub and restaurant business of Allied 
Domecq has suffered a serious setback, after a decision by Trade Secretary Stephen Byers to 
refer the deal to the Competition Commission,” BBC Web site (www.news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/
business/394496.stm), 14 July 1999.
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exiting brewing, and, in May 2000, it sold the business to Interbrew for 
£400 million. 
Thus, in its almost effortless acquisition of Courage, Scottish & New-
castle succeeded in carrying through the merger that the MMC’s deci-
sion to block the Elders IXL bid had prevented in 1989. The move en-
abled the company to secure a leading position in U.K. brewing, which it 
would go on to use as the platform for expansion into Europe after 2000. 
Its victory effectively led to the exit of long-time market leader Bass, 
and its other key competitor Whitbread, from the industry altogether. 
Conclusions
This analysis paints a stark picture of the ability of Scottish & New-
castle’s management team to exploit its political infl uence and, using its 
experience of Britain’s merger regulation apparatus in the 1980s and 
1990s, enable the fi rm to carry out its expansion strategy. While its suc-
cessful defense against a hostile approach from Australian conglomer-
ate Elders IXL might have been attributable to the mistakes made by 
an overly aggressive Elders’ management under John Elliott, its avoid-
ance of the provisions of the 1989 Beer Orders may be ascribed to the 
limit on pub ownership set by the authorities. However, its success in 
avoiding an investigation when crossing the 25 percent market-share 
threshold in acquiring Courage is more diffi cult to explain without re-
course to some form of higher level political infl uence, since a decision 
to approve the acquisition was made before the MMC’s advice was 
sought. Contemporaneous documents and retrospective accounts all 
point to the strength of the political connections of Scottish & New-
castle’s top manager, Sir Alick Rankin, which transcended even the 
powerful lobbying of the wider domestic brewing industry. While Sir 
Alick was no longer directly part of the day-to-day management team, 
Courage was transacted under his tenure as group chairman, a position 
that naturally brings individuals into contact with the wider political 
establishment. 
The Independent newspaper’s obituary of Sir Alick Rankin in 1999 
points to the political forces at work behind the scenes: 
Elders was a daunting opponent but, to its apparent surprise, it 
found Rankin’s S&N equal to the challenge. In a campaign that was 
not without subsequent irony, Rankin played the Scottish card to 
mobilise both public and political opinion in defence of S&N. . . . 
The episode made Rankin’s reputation, and saw him invited on to 
numerous blue-chip boards. . . . At the same time he was gaining 
public recognition as a leading light in the ranks of the quangocracy 
[independent organisations fi nanced by government] which ran 
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much of public policy in pre-devolution Scotland, and he became a 
key ally of Scotland’s embattled Tory ministers.64
Explaining the Scottish & Newcastle case purely by reference to the 
stated competition rules of the prevailing U.K. merger regime is fraught 
with diffi culty, given the inconsistency of the various rulings that were 
made over the period. Not only was the role of political infl uence clearly 
important—in particular the “special interest pleading” of the Scottish 
lobby—but also a case can be made for the existence of a form of cap-
ture by a politically well-connected fi rm in its sequential interactions 
with the British merger regime, enabling it to triumph on several occa-
sions during a period of industry upheaval. A politically well-connected 
and infl uential fi gure supported by a wider special-interest lobby (Scot-
tish business interests) might be optimally situated to learn from the 
complex axis comprising the government, its regulatory agents, and in-
dustry and from the opportunities that it might present. 
More than two decades after Casson identifi ed a knowledge gap in 
his detailed analysis of the entrepreneur, the subject is still open for 
consideration in the business history literature.65 Despite a return to 
longitudinal case studies of fi rms and industries in both the business 
history and corporate strategy literature, little scholarly attention has 
been paid to the impact of political relations and pressures on how 
mergers and acquisitions infl uence fi rm performance and industry 
structure. As Jones and Wadhwani point out, “There are major oppor-
tunities to complement existing research on the role of institutions in 
economic growth by exploring the relationship between institutions 
and entrepreneurs.”66 In this sense, our article links the study of regu-
latory capture in economics to the study of the entrepreneur’s role in 
order to close the gap in knowledge that exists at the convergence of 
corporate strategy and the regulatory framework of government. Navi-
gating this interface on behalf of both bidding and target fi rms would 
appear to be crucial to the study of corporate growth strategies built on 
the use of mergers and acquisitions. 
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